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talk a bit about what you see as the role of philosophy in 
contemporary society? What does philosophical work have 
to do with our political, ethical, and everyday lives?
Jm: that is a really important and a really difficult question. 
one of the results of the professionalization and narrow 
specialization of philosophers is that our work often becomes 
too far removed from ordinary affairs, too detached from 
the lives and concerns of ordinary people. But we have 
an obligation to connect our philosophical reflections (no 
matter how abstract they get) back to real life and real 
people; not that each of us needs to do this in every essay 
or in every class, but we collectively have the responsibility 
to show how our critical reflections bear on people’s lives 
and problems. For me, philosophy should be a critical 
activity that offers new avenues for thinking and acting to 
people. It is in this sense that I am drawn to philosophers 
like Wittgenstein and Jane Addams, whose philosophical 
reflections begin and end with actual practices and people’s 
lived experiences; that should the starting point and the end 
point of our philosophical exercise and in between what we 
need to produce and work with is perplexity, that is, a deep 
interrogation of how we do things and how we think and 
feel, an interrogation that interrupts the flow of familiarity 
and obviousness of our lives, making the familiar unfamiliar 
and the obvious bizarre. the emphasis placed on the critical 
potential of perplexity by philosophers like Addams and 
Wittgenstein (and of course many others since Socrates) 
points in the direction of processes of self-estrangement 
and self-questioning in which we look at ourselves with fresh 
eyes, and we become capable of calling into question things 
we have taken for granted and have become invisible to us, 
being then able to recognize limitations and possibilities for 
transformation and improvement. of course, making people 
perplexed is not enough. Philosophers (in collaboration with 
other scholars and also with artists and activists) need to find 
ways of making that perplexity productive in leading people 
to think and act better, not just in more sophisticated ways, 
but also and more importantly in ethically, politically, and 
epistemically responsible ways. Ways of doing this can be 
found in the critical methodologies of feminist theory, queer 
theory, and critical race theory. these are some of the most 
innovative theories philosophy has offered in recent years 
and they have a tremendous transformative potential for our 
political, ethical, and everyday lives.
nC: As we’ve discussed, in your written work you actively 
and critically interrogate philosophical, political, and 
epistemological assumptions. In doing so, you engage in 
this important work of making your readers more perplexed 
while asking them to think and act in more responsible ways. 
How do your work in teaching and mentoring play into this 
practice of philosophy for you? 
Jm: I cannot think of philosophy without teaching as an 
essential part, whether in the classroom, reading groups, 
workshops, conferences, or in more informal ways. 
Philosophy is a self-critical exercise, but for me it is not 
something that can be done by individuals in isolation 
because it requires a practice of mutual interrogation and 
challenge; it involves learning from others and their critical 
exercises as well as offering our own reflections for the 
learning of others. one thing that I think philosophy as a 
critical activity should help us do is to bring teaching and 
activism closer together, so that our philosophical activities 
become oriented toward the critique and transformation of 
both theories and practices at the same time. this aspiration 
is something that have in common with all the authors I draw 
from: pragmatists, feminists, queer theorists, and critical 
race theorists. the ways in which these different theorists 
practice philosophy provide useful paradigms or models for 
how to do philosophy in a critical and transformative way, 
working toward making a difference in people’s lives.
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For readers interested in acquiring insight into the plight 
of people of color in academic philosophy, particularly 
the predicament of African Americans and Latino/as in the 
field, Reframing the Practice of Philosophy is incredibly 
illuminating while simultaneously upsetting. each essay 
tackles tough questions of inclusion and exclusion in ways 
that reveal an assortment of biases and structural flaws latent 
to professional philosophy. “the attempt to explore and 
explicate the lack of African Americans and Latinos/as in the 
field of philosophy,” Yancy writes, “actually resulted in a much 
broader and comprehensive text that uncovered complex 
and multifaceted issues such as alienation, institutional 
prejudices, insidious racism, canonical exclusion, linguistic 
exclusion, nonrecognition, disrespect, white hegemony 
and power, discursive silencing, philosophical territorial 
arrogance, and indignation” (2). the volume is a powerful, 
self-conscious, and exigent analysis of one of the whitest 
fields in academia. more honest conversations like this must 
take place in order for our field to reinvent itself along more 
equitable lines, assuming that this is indeed a collective goal.
Almost every essay addresses one or more of the above 
issues through insightful argumentation infused with 
autobiographic prose—a hallmark of several of Yancy’s 
volumes. the contributors comprise a prominent list of 
active Latino/a and Black voices in professional philosophy, 
many of whom specialized in more “mainstream” areas of 
philosophy prior to delving into such topics as philosophy of 
race, feminist theory, Latin American philosophy, Caribbean 
philosophy, Africana philosophy, and more. through their 
efforts, the volume asks meta-philosophical questions about 
the nature and practice of philosophical inquiry in societies 
shaped by legacies of racism and other forms of widespread, 
systematic oppression. How has the history of classical, 
institutional, and non-conscious forms of racism, particularly 
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that which targets Blacks and Hispanics, or, for the same 
reason, the blind commitment to a tradition that continually 
marginalizes minorities, women, and the philosophical topics 
pertinent to both, affected the conditions that make possible 
philosophical inquiry? How have the range of questions 
philosophers are willing to ask, the type of books they read, 
the kinds of people they listen to been shaped by the history 
of these forms of oppression and ignorance? this range of 
questioning alone makes the volume worth picking up.
Philosophers of color alive today will find the text a useful 
resource for dealing with some of the pressures and 
frustrations of academic life. In fact, the volume may serve 
as a springboard for voicing one’s opinion and (most likely) 
similar experiences. As Yancy explains, “I began to see just 
how important the text had become beyond the scope of 
low numbers, particularly in terms of the text’s forward-
looking dimensions. the text constitutes an important site—a 
textual balm of sorts—for blacks and Latino/as currently 
pursuing degrees in philosophy and who, as a result, may 
feel isolated, ‘out of place,’ and marginalized. moreover, the 
text speaks to future philosophers of color who might need 
confirmation of their sanity, a collective voice that says, ‘We 
also know your pain, your blues’” (2).
the dedication to “philosophers of color not yet born” adds 
a sense of urgency to the topics discussed throughout the 
volume, especially in light of changing demographics in the 
United States, which will undoubtedly bring more nonwhites 
into philosophy and expand the range of philosophical 
inquiry. If the critical thinking skills acquired in a philosophical 
education are a good thing, then more should be done 
to ensure that vast segments of the population, if not the 
majority, do not feel alienated from this field of study (this 
might actually serve to philosophy’s benefit in terms of 
institutional support and funding).
In terms of Latin American philosophy, Jorge J. e. Gracia 
describes the canonical marginalization of this sub-discipline 
as follows: “Latin American philosophy is a good example of 
a philosophy systematically excluded from both the Western 
and world philosophical canons as these are conceived in 
the United States. this claim . . . may be easily documented 
by looking at histories of philosophy, reference works, 
anthologies, philosophical societies, evaluating tools of 
philosophy as a field of learning, education programs such as 
the National endowment for the Humanities (NeH) seminars, 
Ph.d. dissertations in philosophy and common areas of 
specialization in the discipline, and the college curriculum (in 
the United States, philosophy is generally taught only at the 
college level)” (89). In his essay, Gracia quickly dismantles 
a veritable list of objections that would justify the exclusion 
of Latin American philosophy from the Western canon. 
However, the real reason, according to Gracia, stems from a 
blind commitment to tradition.
ofelia Schutte summarizes the reasons for the marginalization 
of Latinos/as in professional philosophy with three problems: 
(1) the Anglo/eurocentric orientation of philosophy, (2) the 
desire by “prestigious” philosophers to safeguard prestige 
(sometimes talked about in terms of “rigor”), and (3) the 
“we” of philosophy, or the fact that the mainstream academic 
philosophical community is a rather monochromatic 
bunch where people of color often feel second-class or 
unwelcomed (unless, of course, people of color are willing 
to “play the game” as it is). All of these arguments, Schutte 
explains, depend upon “extra-philosophical” factors that 
reveal implicit biases against Blacks and Latino/as in ways 
that perpetuate the whiteness of philosophy.
Charles mills explains that the entire discipline of philosophy is 
“inimical to the recognition of race.” He continues, “Philosophy 
is supposed to be abstracting away from the contingent, the 
corporeal, the temporal, the material, to get at necessary, 
spiritual, eternal, ideal truths” (60). much of the difficulties 
engendered by the incorporation of marginalized voices 
and topics has to do with the subject matter of philosophical 
thought and its supposed universality. Philosophical truths 
are supposed to escape the realm of the particular and rise 
to a level of abstraction beyond cultural, ethnic, and racial 
particularities (59–60). With one intriguing sentence Bill e. 
Lawson captures the essence of this sentiment when he writes, 
“when race comes in the room, logic goes out the window” 
(197). the idea that race and logic are incompatible can mean 
that when discussions of race take place, conversation quickly 
deteriorates to irrational, emotion-driven fights. Put differently 
(and in terms that garner instantaneous philosophical capital 
in some circles), there cannot be any logos when speaking 
about ethnos.
thus, the volume highlights the subtle and not-so-subtle 
prejudices held by professional philosophers. Besides 
historical contingency, there are no good reasons as to why 
the concerns of people of color are ignored. Although their 
work aspires towards levels of abstraction that make universal 
truth claims possible, philosophers are nonetheless born 
into particular societies, cultures, and histories, all of which 
yield an assortment of racist or sexists leanings, cultural 
insensitivities, bias and jingoism, etc. Yancy thus endeavors 
to show how it is the case that “blacks and Latinos/as often 
experience nonacademic spaces and academic spaces as a 
distinction without a difference” (3).
Along these lines, the critical dimensions of the text are found 
in aggregate. Individually, the question of marginalization or 
specific examples of racist/sexist statements and attitudes 
may appear to be scandalous moral failures, the kind of 
material that gets talked about on national blogs and at 
APA meetings. Viewed piecemeal, these incidents and 
complaints appear sporadic and incidental. However, the 
forms of marginalization experienced by Latino/as and 
African Americans are manifold, often intersecting and 
widespread—this volume serves as proof. By allowing 
prominent thinkers to voice their experiences and concerns 
Yancy’s text allows for the emergence of patterns of 
systematic exclusion that venture beyond the incidental: 
“As the text continued to take shape, what also began to 
emerge was a parallel between many of the issues that 
black and Latino/a bodies experience within the everyday 
world of social perception as linked to pervasive de facto 
racism, and the refined and intellectually highfalutin world 
of professional philosophy” (2). reiterating the goal of the 
text, Yancy writes, “[the] goal was to create a critical space 
where both groups [African Americans and Latino/as] would 
come together to discuss critically a collectively important 
defining theme, a common problem—our marginalization 
within the profession of philosophy, which is one of those 
‘inappropriate’ philosophical subjects” (1).
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Yancy revels in a bit of ambiguity at the end of this quote. 
Not only is the subject matter of philosophy at stake, i.e., the 
range of questions philosophers think about and the ways 
in which philosophical issues pertinent to Latino/as and 
African Americans are often relegated to the philosophical 
wayside, but also at stake is the question of philosophical 
agency, i.e., whether or not Blacks and Hispanics constitute 
true philosophical “subjects.” Central to the volume is the 
assumption that philosophical inquiry is pertinent to what it 
means to be human, a natural outgrowth of having critical 
reflective skills. to deny the ability to practice philosophy, 
or to impose terms that make a fetish of rigor, tradition, and 
prestige, is to deny human subjectivity and autonomy. It is 
to say to Blacks and Latino/as that philosophy cannot take 
place on their terms.
donna-dale marcano’s wonderful contribution, “re-
reading Plato’s Symposium through the Lens of a Black 
Woman,” lends support at this point. marcano’s reading of 
Plato’s Symposium compares the character Alcibiades as 
a stand in for black women in philosophy. Both attempt to 
negotiate their relationship with philosophy (or Socrates) in 
ways that cannot divest themselves of the particularities of 
their existence. She writes, “does philosophy fail some of 
us then? Yes! It fails those of us who understand that we 
are particularly situated. We are particularly situated in our 
desires, in our communities, in our race, in our genders, 
in our loves. For this, black women’s intellectual work that 
engages their racialized and gendered perspectives and 
which aims to take account of the social and political context 
in which these perspectives take shape are often viewed as 
so particular as to be of no philosophical value” (232).
Jacqueline Scott’s essay, “toward a Place Where I Can Bring 
All of me,” speaks towards this notion when comparing the 
“traditional” view of the self as afforded by the history of 
philosophy, and the more complex, “impure” understanding 
of the self provided by life. She writes, “We need to conceive 
of a philosophy that is in the service of life—in the service 
of the complex, multifarious, incoherent lives most people 
really live, and we need to convey this in both our research 
and teaching” (220).
Nelson maldonado-torres explains the way in which his 
studies of Frantz Fanon allowed him to approach a conception 
of “decolonization as first philosophy,” which breaks with 
the idea that some people are subjects of knowledge while 
others are mere objects in need of dominance. He writes, 
“the fundamental axes of reflection about human reality 
are grounded in the human-to-human relation, and that the 
primary questions out of which philosophy itself emerges 
are motivated not so much by wonder in the face of nature, 
but by desire for inter-human contact and scandal in the 
face of the violation of that possibility. this means that the 
telos of thinking, if there is any, is the struggle against 
dehumanization, understood as the affirmation of sociality 
and the negation of its negation. I refer to the negation of 
sociality as coloniality and to its negation and overcoming as 
decoloniality” (261).
Lawson writes something similar: “our colleagues are 
not idiots. they are trained to solve problems. Like most 
people they will work to solve a problem if they think that 
it is important. If they think that racism in the profession is 
a problem, they will begin to work with their own and their 
colleague’s racism and sexism. No person of color can force 
them to work to change the game or their attitudes. If they 
think that blacks are indeed inferior intellectually, then they 
will feel no compulsion to change the game” (197). drawing 
from John Hope Franklin’s “the dilemma of the American 
Negro Scholar,” Lawson continues by stating that if there 
are white philosophers passionate about the elimination of 
disrespectful practices in academic philosophy, they must 
realize that the respect owed to black scholars is connected 
to the type of respect black people receive outside of 
academia. In a powerful line, Lawson writes, “It has been 
a truism that a black person being respected in one arena 
of social interaction gives us no hint of how he or she will 
be respect [sic] in others. However, respect must begin at 
home” (197).
By rethinking the agents responsible for philosophical 
thought, the volume attempts to “reframe” the practice of 
philosophy. this process “steps back and takes another 
look, realizing that the current frame excludes all that 
does not fit with the demarcated limits of that frame.” “In 
fact,” as Yancy continues, “that which is outside the frame 
is constituted as . . . unintelligible and ersatz. this form of 
framing actually deforms, delimits, and truncates the very 
power of philosophical imaginings. to reframe the current 
practices of philosophy, then, functions to reveal the limits 
of its current practices, its current assumptions, its current 
conceptual allegiances, and its current self-images. the aim 
is to expand the hermeneutic horizon of what is possible, 
philosophically” (5).
Yet the process of reframing philosophy remains difficult 
when philosophers inherit forms of prejudice and ignorance 
ingrained throughout their societies. Yancy writes, 
“Philosophical academic spaces are . . . continuous with 
everyday, politically invested, racially grounded, prejudicial, 
social spaces. Such normative (white) academic spaces 
are shot through with much of the same racist toxicity that 
configures black and brown bodies as outside the normative 
(white) demos” (2). returning to Lawson’s essay, his point was 
to note that African Americans will not acquire philosophical 
clout until Black people, as a whole, are respected as 
full, rational agents. this starts at home and in our own 
departments. returning to maldonado-torres’s essay, his 
understanding of philosophy necessitates reciprocal social 
exchanges that assume co-subjectivity; to deny this is to 
colonize the mind of others and even the self (since one is 
denies the possibility for dialogue and instead supplies only 
monologue). returning to Scott’s essay, philosophy should 
be a place where a person does not have to sacrifice one’s 
cultural, ethnic, or racial particularity to reach standards set 
by racist.
obviously, white allies will find much value in the text. more 
importantly, white philosophers who fail to see the importance 
of diversification would also benefit from reading the text. 
At the very least, the volume succeeds in placing the onus 
upon those who fail to see the importance of philosophical 
diversification to justify their stance. Along these lines, several 
contributors provide interesting arguments that explain why 
academic philosophy, as a whole, fails to take seriously the 
philosophical questions pertinent to people of color or even 
make difficult one’s personal existence inside the field. one 
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could only imagine how the text would be improved if it went 
beyond a black/brown binary to include people of Asian and 
indigenous descent (among others). Nonetheless, that form 
of exclusion sets the stage for a new volume expanding this 
discussion in ways beyond the confines of this volume.
ArtICLeS
Seriousness, Irony, and Cultural Politics: 
A Defense of Jorge Portilla
Francisco Gallegos
georgetoWn UniverSity
Nearly sixty years after the publication of the Phenomenology 
of Relajo, the work of Jorge Portilla (1919–1963) seems 
poised for a rediscovery. reading the first english-language 
translation of the text—published just last year as the 
appendix to Carlos Alberto Sánchez’s excellent scholarly 
treatment—one cannot help but wonder how the text 
remained untranslated for so long.1 Portilla’s work is full of 
novel and profound insights into topics that are both timeless 
and timely, including the nature of values, the meaning of 
freedom, and the proper use of passive resistance in the 
struggle for liberation.
the Phenomenology of Relajo (1966) centers upon Portilla’s 
critique of a well-known figure in mexican culture known as 
the relajiento. As a first approximation, we can think of the 
relajiento as a kind of “class clown,” a person who refuses 
to take anything seriously and never misses an opportunity 
to disrupt a group practice. He is an irrepressible jokester, 
beloved and feared for his ability to derail any meeting, 
performance, or party with his loud and obnoxious antics.
In Portilla’s view, mexican culture has always had great 
affection for the jokester. But Portilla worried that what was 
once a delightful cultural idiosyncrasy was becoming a 
dangerous cultural habit that threatened the entire society. 
more and more mexican men were becoming relajientos, 
he thought, and their refusal to take anything seriously 
was becoming truly nihilistic. Portilla worried that “the best 
representatives” of his generation were squandering their 
talents, and “in the midst of perpetual laughter . . . giving 
themselves up, really, to a slow process of self-destruction.”2
Sánchez’s treatment of the Phenomenology illuminates 
how creatively Portilla drew upon european philosophical 
influences to address this distinctively Latin American issue, 
and he is quite persuasive in his argument that this ostensibly 
provincial topic has great relevance for a wider audience. But 
while Sánchez is a capable champion of Portilla’s work, he 
concludes his book by offering some challenging thoughts 
to his readers, suggesting that Portilla may have been 
shortsighted in his unmitigated rejection of the relajiento. 
Sánchez proposes an alternative reading of the relajiento’s 
disruptive behavior that “reconceives it as an act of defiance 
before the colonial legacy . . . and against the axiological 
imperialism which that legacy instituted.”3 the point here, 
I take it, is that when we consider the immense legacy of 
colonial oppression facing our world, and consider how 
many of our cultural practices either collaborate with this 
oppression or seem powerless to challenge it effectively, 
the relajiento begins to look like a heroic freedom fighter, 
engaged in a kind of civil disobedience of the cultural 
sphere. Colonial oppression, Sánchez notes, protected itself 
by imposing “values of sobriety and order and progress,” 
and these values have been “kept alive today as a power 
that itself colonizes.”4 In this context, the behavior of the 
relajiento should be seen as “a creative response of the 
marginal in their marginality, whose resistance to value is, 
truly, an act of defiance.”5
Sánchez hopes that although the relajiento’s apathy and 
disruptions may undermine traditional cultural practices, 
this destruction might clear the way for new and better 
possibilities to emerge. Citing Jean-Francois Lyotard’s call 
in The Postmodern Condition “to increase displacement 
in the games, and even to disorient it, in such a way as to 
make an unexpected ‘move,’” Sánchez suggests that the 
relajiento’s actions might be “such a displacement and such 
an unexpected ‘move.’”6
In the meantime, Sánchez says, the relajiento’s “suspension 
of seriousness” may at least bring peace of mind. the 
relajiento may have found a way to avoid being filled with 
anxiety about the enormous problems confronting the post-
9/11 world and the dizzying complexity of today’s socio-
political landscape. As “an expression of that world and those 
anxieties,” he says, the relajiento “can survive the angst and 
terror through acts of suspension which might, possibly, as 
for the ancient skeptics, bring ataraxia, or tranquility.”7 this 
relajiento’s acts of suspension are thus a way to “postpone” 
serious commitment “for a future time”—a time when taking 
cultural practices seriously will not involve buying into an 
oppressive ideology, and may actually contribute to genuine 
liberation.8
Wrestling with Sánchez’s challenge has inspired me to dig 
deeper into Portilla’s work. While I find Sanchez’s re-reading 
of the relajiento compelling, looking at Portilla from the 
perspective of answering this challenge has unearthed 
aspects of Portilla’s rich text that I had not appreciated 
previously. As a result, I have come to believe that there 
are a few good points to be made in response to Sánchez’s 
criticism. I will try to outline those points here in the hopes of 
contributing to this important, ongoing dialogue about how 
best to understand the relajiento.
In this essay, then, I will defend Portilla’s criticism of the 
relajiento. I argue that Portilla was right to see the relajiento’s 
behavior as counterproductive in the fight for liberation from 
ideological oppression. Genuine freedom, in Portilla’s view 
and mine, requires seriousness and sincerity; it requires 
wholehearted participation in cultural practices that one 
finds truly valuable.
In trying to work out Portilla’s reasoning for this conclusion, 
I will suggest some new ways of understanding Portilla’s 
analysis of values and freedom. I suggest that Portilla sees 
values as neither self-standing nor subjectively posited; 
instead, he thinks that values “emerge” in a mood-like 
way. moreover, Portilla thinks that the values most crucial 
for achieving genuine freedom—the values that unify an 
individual’s experiences into a coherent and meaningful 
